

Message Text

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00001 191140Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----191143 112319 /12

O R 191027Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3108

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BEIRUT 0747

EXDIS

FOR USDEL SECRETARYYY IN RIYADH

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS R.) PFOR, PINT, LE, US, MOPS
SUBJECT: PLENARY SESSION OF SECRETARY'S PARTY IN BEIRUT FEB 18.

1. SUMMARY: SECRETARY VANCE AND OFFICIAL PARTY
MET WITH GOL DELEGATION LED BY PRIMIN AL-HOSS AND
FONMIN/DEFMIN BOUTROS FOR ONE-AND-A-HALF-HOUR
DISCUSSION IN CABINET ROOM AT BAABDA PALACE ON FEB 18.
PRIMARY TOPICS WERE:

A. PROSPECTS FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.
THE SECRETARY REVIEWED U.S. POLICY AND DESCRIBED
THE STATE OF PLAY AS WE SEE IT. GOL OFFICIALS STRESSED
IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING GENEVA CONFERENCE, AND PLO
PARTICIPATION, AND EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT LEBANON
BE INCLUDED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

B. SOUTHERN LEBANON. FONMIN BOUTROS
DESCRIBED GREAT PROBLEMS GOL FACES IN EXTENDING
ITS AUTHORITY IN THIS AREA AND NEED TO USE ASF
FORCES SINCE NO ADEQUATE LEBANESE FORCES ARE
AVAILABLE. HE CLAIMED ISRAELI POSITION WAS
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UNREASONABLE. THE SECRETARY PRAISED LEBANON'S
STATESMANSHIP IN ACTING TO DEFUSE THE IMMEDIATE
CRISIS AND EXPLAINED ISRAELI CONCERNS AT HAVING
SYRIAN FORCES MOVE CLOSER TO ITS BORDERS.

C. U.S. AID TO LEBANON. U.S. SIDE EXPLAINED
\$50 MILLION AID PACKAGE AND PRIMIN AL-HOSS

INQUIRED ABOUT ADDITIONAL U.S. ASSISTANCE THAT
MIGHT BE AVAILABLE.
END SUMMARY.

2. VOLLOING IS AN UNCLEARED RESUME OF THE MEETING OF
SECRETARY VANCE AND HIS PARTY WITH PRIME MINISTER AL-
HOSS, FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS AND SEVERAL FOREIGN
MINISTRY OFFICIALS AT BAABDA PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, 1145-
1315, FEBRUARY 18.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS OPENED MEETING BY
WELCOMING AMERICAN DELEGATION. HE SAID VISIT WAS A
SYMBOL OF UNITED STATES INTEREST IN LEBANON. LEBANON
WAS IN AN AREA OF WORLD WHICH HAD HAD SERIOUS TROUBLES
FOR MANY YEARS. LEBANON HAD HAD TO BEAR TOO MANY
BURDENS GIVEN ITS SIZE AND OPPULATION. NOW, LEBANON WAS
MORE CONFIDENT OF ITS FUTURE, BECAUSE IT COULD RELY ON
ITS FRIENDS, INCLUDING UNITED STATES. LEBANON RELIED
UPON UNITED STATES AS BOTH A GREAT POWER AND AS
DECISIVE FACTOR IN MIDDLE EAST. LEBANESE HOPED UNITED
STATES WOULD ABIDE BY PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, AND WOULD HELP PROMOTE LEBANESE UNITY.
(AT THIS POINT, PRIME MINISTER AL-HOSS JOINED MEETING.)

4. SECRETARY VANCE THANKED LEBANESE DELEGATION FOR
ITS WELCOME. HE SAID UNITED STATES WAS COMMITTED TO
LEBANON, TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY, ITS UNITY AND ITS
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. UNITED STATES WANTED TO HELP
WITH LEBANON'S RECONSTRUCTION. UNITED STATES
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UNDERSTOOD THAT A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WAS IMPORTANT
FOR LEBANON, AND WAS COMMITTED TO SEEKING ONE.
SECRETARY SAID HE WAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO SEEK OUUT
VIEWS OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES, ON MATTERS OF BOTH
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE. WE HAD SAID IN A LATER
PHASE THE UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO HELP THE PARTIES
RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES. WE HAD SAID THERE SHOULD
BE A GENEVA CONFERENCE IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1977, AND
THE UNITED STATES WAS COMMITTED TO THAT END.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS SUGGESTED AN AGENDA OF
TWO POINTS: 1) GENEVA -- (A) OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
CHANCES OF SUCCESS AND (B) THE QUESTION OF LEBANESE
PARTICIPATION; AND 2) THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH LEBANON.

6. RE GENEVA, BOUTROS SAID HE KNEW SECRETARY HAD COME
TO LISTEN RATHER THAN TO TALK BUT WOULD LIKE TO HEAR
ANYTHING HE COULD SAY ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF THE
PARTIES, ESPECIALLY ISRAEL AND EGYPT. SECRETARY

RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT ROAD AHEAD WAS DIFFICULT. PROGRESS WOULD ONLY COME SLOWLY; NEVERTHELESS, THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. THERE WERE TWO SETS OF ISSUES: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL. PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WERE THREE: 1) PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; 2) WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES; AND 3) PALESTINIAN QUESTION. (SECRETARY STRESSED THAT HE ASSIGNED NO PARTICULAR ORDER OF PRIORITY AMONG THE THREE.) HE SAID VERY DEEP DIVISIONS EXIST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES ON THESE KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, BUT HE DETECTED DURING EARLIER PART OF HIS TRIP A WILLINGNESS BY BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, PROVIDED THAT THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS WERE FIRST RESOLVED. THAT WAS PROGRESS.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----191211 112570 /11

O R 191027Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3109

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 BEIRUT 0747

EXDIS

FOR USDEL SECRETARY IN RIYADH

7. MAIN PROCEDURAL PROBLEM, SECRETARY SAID, WAS QUESTION OF PLO PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE NOTED THAT PRECEDING EVENING THERE WERE INDICATIONS IN MEDIA THAT PALESTINIAN "COVENANT" VIS-A VIS ISRAEL MIGHT CHANGE AT FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS. THIS WAS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR HIM TO GET INVOLVED TOO SPECIFICALLY AT THIS TIME IN INDICATING OUR VIEWS OF THE SHAPE OF A SETTLEMENT, SINCE THE UNITED STATES NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO MOVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

8. ON LEBANESE PARTICIPATION IN A GENEVA CONFERENCE, SECRETARY SAID IT SEEMED CLEAR LEBANESE HAD INTEREST

IN PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND IT CONCERNED THEM GREATLY.
AS FAR AS WE CONCERNED, THEY WERE WELCOME TO
PARTICIPATE. THEY HAD A LEGITIMATE INTEREST.

9. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT
APPROACH OF UNITED STATES SEEMED ENCOURAGING. HE SAID
A PLO PRESENCE AT GENEVA WAS "A MUST." IF IT WAS NOT
REPRESENTED, THERE WOULD BE NO ENDURING SOLUTION TO
THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, SINCE TWO OF THE THREE
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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH THE SECRETARY MENTIONED
EARLIER COULD NOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT THE PALESTINIANS.
BOUTROS SAID LEBANON COULD NOT PLAY A ROLE IN RESOLVING
QUESTION OF PLO PARTICIPATION BECAUSE OF LEBANON'S OWN
SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

10. BOUTROS CONTINUED THAT, IF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
FAILED, THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSTITUTE. IT WAS THE VIEW
OF LEBANON THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS THE ONLY
POSSIBLE WAY TO A SOLUTION. IF IT FAILED, THERE WOULD
BE RADICALIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE SAID, "YOU
COULD DESTROY THE COUNTRY (LEBANON) YOU ARE REBUILDING."

11. BOUTROS SAID UNITED STATES COULD PERCEIVE AND
UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S OWN LONG-TERM INTERESTS BETTER THAN
ISRAEL ITSELF. ISRAELIS WERE RADICALS WHO COULD NOT
SEE BIG PICTURE. US COULD DO SO BETTER THAN THEY.

12. BOUTROS SAID THAT LEBANON HAD NOT BEEN CONCERNED
VERY MUCH WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS NOS.
242 AND 338: LEBANON HAD NO BORDER PROBLEM WITH
ISRAEL, WITH WHICH IT HAD SHARED A RECONGNIZED BORDER
SINCE 1949, AND HAD NOT ENGAGED IN MILITARY ACTION
AGAINST ISRAEL IN 1967 OR 1973. LEBANON WOULD NOT
WANT TO IMPLY THAT BY ATTENDING GENEVA IT WANTED TO
REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THAT BORDER. THEREFORE, IT
FOLLOWED THAT LEBANON'S INTEREST MIGHT BE BEST SERVED
BY INITIALLY TAKING A PASSIVE ROLE AT GENEVA. AFTER
BEING INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE, LEBANON COULD TAKE A
MORE ACTIVE ROLE AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. LEBANON
WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN ORDER TO HAVE A "FINAL
RECOGNITION" OF ITS BORDER WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID
LEBANON WOULD MAKE NECESSARY DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES ON
THIS QUESTION TO USG AND OTHERS THROUGH THEIR LOCAL
EMBASSIES.

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13. PRIME MINISTER AL-HOSS STRESSED THAT, "WE CANNOT AFFORD TO SEE GENEVA FAIL." HE SAID TOO MUCH PRIORITY SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION AT GENEVA. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THERE BE AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE ITS OWN CONCEPTION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ISRAEL COULD NOT SURVIVE WITHOUT UNITED STATES MILITARY AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, THEREFORE IT FOLLOWED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE ISRAEL.

14. SECRETARY RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT WAS CLEARLY UP TO THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. UNITED STATES COULD NOT DICTATE A SOLUTION. ON TIMING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, UNITED STATES WAS OF VIEW THAT IT COULD NOT BEGIN BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, THAT IS, BEFORE END OF MAY, AND EVEN THAT WOULD NOT GIVE TIME FOR THE INEVITABLE CABINET SHUFFLE, ETC. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT SECOND HALF OF 1977 WAS PROBABLY EARLIEST REALISTIC DATE.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----191220 112654 /21

O R 191027Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3110

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EXDIS

FOR USDEL SECRETARY IN RIYADH

15. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS SAID HIS GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THAT UNITED STATES WAS NOT ABOUT TO DICTATE A SOLUTION, BUT HE URGED THAT UNITED STATES CONVINCE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE ONE.

16. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO PROBLEM OF SOUTH LEBANON. BOUTROS INTRODUCED TOPIC BY SAYING HE HAD BEEN UNDER IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS "SOMEWHERE" A "RED LINE," BUT IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAD LEARNED OTHERWISE. THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH WAS "PRECARIOUS." IT COULD ENGENDER INSTABILITY ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. ABOUT 400 ARAB SECURITY FORCE TROOPS HAD MOVED FROM KFAR HUNI SOUTHWARD TO THE SUBURBS OF NABATIYAH, WITH ONLY LIGHT ARMAMENTS. THE ISRAELIS SUDDENLY STARTED CLAIMING, BOTH THROUGH MEDIA AND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, THAT THEY WERE THREATENED. THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT WAS THAT NABATIYAH WAS A SYMBOL. BOUTROS SAID HE THEREFORE HAD TOLD THE AMERICAN CHARGE, MR. LANE, THAT ARAB SECURITY FORCE IN FACT WAS NEVER IN NABATIYAH, ONLY NEARBY. NEVERTHELESS, ISRAELIS OBJECTED THHT KFAR TIBNIT WAS TOO CLOSE.

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17. BOUTROS SAID THAT THE DIALOGUE OVER THIS WITH ISRAEL HAD BEEN UNFAIR. ISRAELIS WERE TRYING TO CREATE ARGUMENTS. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AGREED TO "REDEPLOY" TO ASHIYAH. BOUTROS HAD TOLD CHARGE LANE THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI INTERFERENCE ON ITS OWN TERRITORY. HE CONSIDERED THAT LEBANON HAD ALREADY DONE ENOUGH TO SATISFY ISRAELI ELECTORAL PURPOSES. WITHDRAWAL HAD NOT BEEN EASY AND THEY HAD HAD TO TAKE MANY FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION: (A) ASF HAD MOVED UNDER LEBANESE, NOT SYRIAN, ORDERS; (B) IT WAS NOT EASY FOR ASF TO OBEY ISRAELI DEMANDS; (C) PRESTIGE OF PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT AT STAKE; (D) IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN REGION. ISRAELIS NOW ACTING IN THAT AREA AS THOUGH IT WAS CONQUERED TERRITORY. THIS WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES. HE COULD ASSURE US THAT IF IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO SEND IN LEBANESE TROOPS WITHOUT RISKING ADVENTURE, THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO. AS HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY EARLIER, LEBANESE ARMY WAS NOT AN ARMY. IT WAS SPLIT INTO FACTIONS. THEY WERE NOT RYING TO INVOLVE NON-LEBANESE TROOPS IN AREA, BUT HAD THOUGHT SENDING IN ASF WAS LEAST DANGEROUS COURSE.

18. SECRETARY RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT UNITED STATES APPRECIATED LEBANON'S STATESMANSHIP WHICH HELPED DEFUSE A DANGEROUS SITUATION. ROLE OF UNTIED STATES WAS NOT THAT OF AN ARBITER BUT RATHER A FRIEND OF BOTH PARTIES WHO COULD ASSURE THAT EACH SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERNS OF THE OTHER. UNITED STATES WAS SENSITIVE TO LEBANON'S NEED TO ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER THROUGHOUT

ITS TERRITORIES. UNITED STATES WAS ALSO SENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT LEBANON DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER TO DEPLOY TO THE SOUTH. NEVERTHELESS, ISRAELIS WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS "SYRIAN TROOPS" MOVING TOWARDS THEIR BORDER. AS A FRIEND OF THE PARTIES TO THE ISSUE, THE
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UNITED STATES PASSED MESSAGES AMONG LEBANON, ISRAEL, AND SYRIA. HE THOUGHT RESULT WAS DEFUSING OF SITUATION IN REASONABLE WAY.

19. SECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED QUESTION WITH PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT NIGHT BEFORE. SADAT HAD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM EGYPTIAN REP ON QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE THAT LEBANON HAD A FORCE OF SOME 500 LEBANESE TROOPS WHICH THEY COULD HAVE REDEPLOYED TO THE SOUTH. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD SADAT HE WOULD RAISE THIS WITH GOL.

20. BOUTROS SAID THAT SITUATION IN THE SOUTH WAS SO DELICATE THAT IF GOL SENT IN THE TROOPS IT HAD FIGHTING WOULD RESUME IN A FASHION SIMILAR TO WHAT PREVAILED JUST A FEW MONTHS AGO. SADAT'S REP KNEW PROBLEM BUT DID NOT UNDERSTAND LEBANESE SENSIBILITIES BECAUSE HE DID NOT LIVE WITH THEM. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE THAN GLAD TO SEND LEBANESE FORCES TO THE SOUTH AS SOON AS IT BECAME POSSIBLE. PRIME MINISTER AL-HOSS OBSERVED THAT LEBANESE ARMY WAS ALREADY PRESENT IN THE SOUTH BUT WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO FACTIONS WHICH WERE FIGHTING EACH OTHER. A MORE REALISTIC SOLUTION WOULD BE TO MAKE USE OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, BUT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY ARMS.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O R 191027Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3111

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EXDIS

FOR USDEL SECRETARY IN RIYADH

21. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT KIND OF TIME SHCHEDULE THEY ENVISIONED FOR RECREATION OF LEBANESE ARMY, BUT QUESTION WAS NOT ANSWERED.

2. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, THE SECRETARY, NOTING A POINT MADE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON, SAID THAT, AT ORIGINAL GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1973, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT ANY ADDITION OF PARTICIPANTS TO THE CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON BY ALL THE PARTIES ALREADY REPRESENTED, NOT JUST THE CO-SPONSORS. BOUTROS SAID THAT MIGHT MEAN ISRAEL WOULD OBJECT TO LEBANESE PARTICIPATION, BUT OPINED THAT, IF QUESTION OF PLO REPRESENTATION WAS RESOLVED, THEN PERHAPS QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION COULD BE RESOLVED AS WELL.

23. RETURNING TO DISCUSSION OF SOUTH LEBANON, SECRETARY STRESSED THAT ISRAELIS PERCEIVED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AS A MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES CLOSER TO THEIR BORDER. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS OBJECTED BY POINTING OUT THAT LEBANON HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REINFORCEMENT OF
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THE VERY SMALL FORCE WHICH DEPLOYED SOUTHWARD, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER MOVEMENT WITHOUT PRIOR UNDERSTANDING AND CONSENT FROM THE ISRAELIS. (AT THIS POINT THE SECRETARY DEPARTED THE MEETING TO CALL ON PRESIDENT SARKIS, MR. HABIB ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S. SIDE.)

24. THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO AID PACKAGE WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ANNOUNCING PUBLICLY THE SAME DAY. MR. HABIB SUGGESTED THAT CONFERENCE MIGHT DISCUSS PRESS RELEASE WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE USG AND ALREADY MADE AVAILABLE TO THE GOL.

25. PRIME MINISTER AL-HOSS ASKED IF THE \$50 MILLION AID PACKAGE WAS ALL THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS GOING TO OFFER LEBANON. MR. HABIB RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS OUR FIRST EFFORT. THE

\$50 MILLION PACKAGE WAS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE UNDER EXISTING FUNDS. ADDITIONAL AID WOULD REQUIRE NEW APPROPRIATION FROM THE CONGRESS IN FORTHCOMING BUDGETS. AL-HOSS ASKED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE HOUSING "GUARANTY" PROGRAM. WOULD THE U.S. PROVIDE \$15 MILLION IN LOANS FOR HOUSING, OR WOULD IT GUARANTEE LOANS FROM COMMERCIAL SOURCES IN THE AMOUNT OF \$15 MILLION? MR. HABIB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS PROGRAM HAD BEEN WORKED OUT WITH LEBANESE OFFICIALS AND WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THEM. HE BELIEVED USG WOULD GUARANTEE LONG-TERM/LOW-INTEREST LOANS FOR HOUSING IN LEBANON FROM PRIVATE LENDING INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IT WAS A VERY INTERESTING PROPOSAL.

26. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED IF EXPORT-IMPORT BANK WOULD BE INVOLVED. MR. HABIB RESPONDED THAT EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AS IN NO WAY INVOLVED CONFIDENTIAL

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IN THE \$50 MILLION PROGRAM, IT DEALT IN LOANS FOR BANKABLE PROJECTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT LEBANON SEEK EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS IN THE NORMAL WAY. HOSS ASKED IF EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR REPAIR OF INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES, SUCH AS THE PORT AND AIRPORT. MR. HABAB SAID YES, PARTICULARLY FOR THE PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT FOR SUCH FACILITIES. HOSS OBSERVED THAT LEBANON STILL HAD A STRONG FINANCIAL RESERVE POSITION. MR. HABIB OBSERVED THAT THIS WOULD HELP INTEREST THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK IN LEBANON.

27. MR. ATHERTON ASKED WHAT WAS THE FOCUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON. PRIME MINISTER AL-HOSS SAID THAT UN WAS HELPING IN TWO AREAS: (1) EXPERTISE, AND (2) EMERGENCY RELIEF. AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THE UNITED NATIONS TO UNDERTAKE A SURVEY OF EMERGENCY RELIEF NEEDS IN LEBANON, BUT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD SO FAR NOT RESPONDED TO THIS REQUEST.

28. AL-HOSS ASKED IF UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT, OBSERVING IN PASSING THAT HE HAD BEEN A PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY. MR. HABIB ASSURED HIM THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO HELP AUB. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED HOW MUCH. MR. HABIB SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW PRECISELY, AND ASKED AMBASSADOR PARKER TO

DEVELOP AND PRESENT SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
TO WASHINGTON. PRIME MINISTER AL-HOSS SAID AUB
HAD ASKED THE GOL FOR LL19 MILLION,
AND THAT THE LEBANESE GOVT HAD ALREADY PROVIDED
LL 9 MILLION TO THE UNIVERSITY.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, VISITS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 19-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BEIRUT00747
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770284-1061
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Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3271866
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PLENARY SESSION OF SECRETARY'S PARTY IN BEIRUT FEB 18.
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, PINT, MOPS, LE, US, IS, EG, XF, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (AL-HOSS, SALIM AHMAD)
To: RIYADH
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3452f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009